In this event study, we find the announcement by the Bank of France in 1907 to accelerate gold payments directly for U.S. crops is associated with the ultimate upturn in U.S. equity prices. We find evidence that spillover to the French financial markets accompanied the Regents' decision to release sterilized reserves, thereby arresting the drainage of coin in French circulation. In counterfactual analysis, we find that the facility alone would have been unlikely to end the crisis.
Introduction
Received tradition ascribes the resolution of the Panic of 1907 to a series of efforts to expand domestic liquidity. In this event study, however, we find it was a direct intervention by the French in the U.S. money market that ultimately relieved the crisis by providing an ongoing, exogenous source of international liquidity to the American system and changing US equity price expectations.
We test for the U.S. equity market response to information flows regarding domestic and foreign monetary events. Equity prices are selected as indicators of which event is associated with an end to the crisis because as long as equity prices were declining, threats of loan default in the U.S. banking system were still growing. In the period leading up to the 1907 crisis, about half of all bank loans in the U.S. were secured by stocks in the call loan market (Myers, 1931, p. 270) . Sprague (1910, p. 301) identifies the sensitivity of the New York Clearing House banks to call loans securitized by stock exchange collateral by noting that 85 percent of the $63 million loan increase among those banks during the crisis were call or time loans. Furthermore, Hansen (2013) notes that time and call loans accounted for half of all trust company assets in 1907.
Indeed, the Moore Schley brokerage house, vulnerable because of a concentrated stock position, received a high profile rescue during the Panic period ostensibly to avoid further problems for its bank and trust company creditors. Thus, falling equity prices could be a channel for spreading bankruptcy among financial intermediaries. Therefore, threats to the banking system would finally abate when equity prices started to rise.
The crash of United Copper stock on October 17, and the ensuing, severe runs on trust companies are renowned events studied by previous scholars of the 1907 Panic, including Sprague (1910) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Moen and Tallman (1995) , Tallman (2000) , and Wicker (2000) . Bruner and Carr (2007) We challenge the conventional wisdom that domestic actions alone were sufficient to change expectations for equity prices. We find that it was the announcement by the Bank of France to accelerate its gold payments directly for U.S. crops, a truncation of the typical "bill-ofexchange" process of trade settlement, that ultimately reversed the downtrend in equity prices.
In counterfactual analysis, however, we caution that the French facility would have been unlikely to end the crisis alone. We argue that domestic measures likely provided non-trivial relief, so that when the French announcement came, it was able to finally revise equity market participants' expectations upward.
Signs of spillover to the French banking and financial systems accompanied the French decision to construct a loan facility in which French bankers could use commercial paper to pay for gold from the French reserve. Furthermore, an analysis of the discussion among the Regents of the Bank of France reveals how the facility was most likely intended to arrest the drainage of French coin in circulation. We conclude that domestic measures to increase liquidity did not by themselves reverse falling equity prices. It took commodity exports with offsetting capital account inflows, specifically shipping U.S. cotton in return for French gold, to provide the exogenous source of liquidity that ultimately improved investors' expectations and rallied stock prices.
[Insert Table 1 here] We study seven international and domestic monetary events (see Table 1 ) to test whether any are associated with changes in U. S. equity prices. We define monetary news as an announcement in the New York Times about central bank policy, gold flows, or other measures that might be expected to impact systemic liquidity conditions. Windows of at least two days are defined to allow for lead and lag effects. Window overlap is avoided. Often, the New York Times dripped details about ad hoc measures over several days as facilities were worked out. In those cases, longer windows are constructed to accommodate longer lag effects. We end the event windows with the news story that imparts substantially most of the new information about the action. We make allowances for our potential errors by designating both a narrow and broad dating of event windows to allow for alternative end points. We estimate two separate models, one using a narrow window length and one using a broader window length to test for robustness of window definitions.
Events One and Two: Announcements by International Banks to Defend their Reserves
France and the U.K. were actively seeking gold from the U.S. in 1907 to shore up their central bank reserves. The French action to open a facility to draw gold from the U.S. in July 1907 is examined as Event One and the British action to draw gold from all markets by raising its bank rate is examined as Event Two. Each event should have alerted investors of increasing risks associated with constrained liquidity and higher interest rates. Consequently, investors should have revised their expectations for corporate profits downward and sold equities.
[Insert Table 2 here] London credit markets began to feel stress long before the U.S. panic began in October 1907. Table 2 The Bank of France had experienced a significant reduction in its gold reserve from January through June 1907, partly to alleviate the Bank of England's efforts to support Egypt as shown in Figure 1 (Patron, 1910, p. 143) . Rather than raising its bank rate to attract gold, the French implemented a strategy to draw gold inflows from the U.S. to France by initiating a special facility on July 24 of paying interest on gold in transit from the U.S. The largest gold outflow from the U.S. in three years happened in July 1907. It matched the year's largest monthly gold inflow to France. For purposes of this study, market participants read stories in the New York Times from July 24 through July 31, which reported how the Bank of France was attempting to restore its reserves by drawing gold from the U.S. On August 15, October 28, and November 1, 4, and 7, investors also read announcements in the New York Times about increases in the London bank rate that were meant to protect British gold reserves.
Events Three through Six: Announcements of Domestic Measures to Increase Liquidity
Market participants were exposed to news stories from October 17 through October 23 about the severe trust company runs; those dates mark the boundaries of our Event Three. We consider the runs on the trust companies to be a domestic monetary event because they represented a significant withdrawal of liquidity from the banking system.
1
The announcements should have heightened uncertainty about the reliability of the banking system. Faced with such announcements, it would be logical for market agents to incorporate increasing uncertainty into their evaluation of equity prices.
2
The formation of the so-called Morgan money pools on October 24 and 25 is the next domestic facility around which we construct our Event Four window. This is the marquee event of the crisis, from which sprang the tradition of attributing the resolution of the crisis to J.
Pierpont Morgan. Convening 20 of the 58 Clearing House Association member banks, Morgan convinced them to lend a "pool" of money to floor brokers at the New York Stock Exchange.
Lending by the pool temporarily alleviated a settlement crisis on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, avoiding its threatened closure. Market agents should have reacted positively to the news of a commitment to maintain liquidity at the Exchange.
The Event Five window is constructed around the announcement by the New York Clearing House Association on October 26 to issue Clearing House loan certificates to member banks and to suspend deposit convertibility. The decision of the New York Clearing House Association to issue clearing house loan certificates to its members provided a way in which to settle imbalances of interbank balances. The accompanying decision to suspend payment in defense of banking reserves precipitated more or less complete suspension throughout the entire country. While the decision to suspend payment of coin for deposits dismayed Sprague (1910), Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 163 ) took a different view, suggesting the decision to suspend 1 We follow Sprague (1910), Wilson et al. (1990) , Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and many others by considering the runs on banks or trust companies as a hallmark of a financial crisis.
2 While stories about runs at trust companies persisted until November 5 when a trust company syndicate was formed as a collective body performing a similar coordination function as the Clearing House did for banks, those stories emphasized how few retail customers were in line each day and how withdrawal requests were completely met each day.
avoided an even more acute hoarding phenomenon. As had been the case in the crises of 1873 and again in 1893, a premium on gold quickly appeared in the market. Acknowledging the thorough research previously done on this event by Sprague (1910) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Moen and Tallman (1995) , Tallman (2000) and Wicker (2000) , this study simply notes the pivotal announcement date of October 26 as a point about which market participants might have altered their expectations of equity prices. In our test for robustness, we extend this window Canal bond issuance marks our Event Six. Some scholars point to it as the event that ended the 1907 Panic (Carosso, 1970; Burner and Carr, 2007) . In an effort to expand the collateral against which banks could issue bank notes, Cortelyou approved the issuance of $50,000,000 in 2 percent Panama Canal bonds on November 17 and the issuance of $100 million one-year 3 percent U.S. Treasury certificates on November 19. On November 16, the New York Times published the rumor that the bonds might be issued and cited November 14 as the day rumors had actually begun to circulate. Between November 17 and 21, negative details about the instruments were printed. Stories about the uncertain legality of the instruments, the inadequacy of the coupons to compete with the currency premium, the necessity of appointing each subscribing bank as a government depository and the long lead time to coordinate payment and physical production of the bank notes all likely dampened expectations for the facility to bring immediate relief. Doubts may have arisen about what had been intended to be an unambiguously positive government measure to increase liquidity. While the event window could have conceivably been extended to December 1 to allow for the announcement of allotments (which could have overlapped with our Event 7), we end the window on November 21 when the news of expected allotments was published. Indeed, the issue went significantly undersubscribed with only about 30 percent of the issue purchased (Sprague, 1910, p. 316) . Therefore, the effect of this event on expectations for equity prices could have been positive for some agents but ambiguous for others.
Event Seven:
The Announcement by the Bank of France to Release Gold Eagles Directly to New York
The announcement by the Bank of France on November 22 to release U.S. gold eagle coins for discounted French commercial paper drawn against U.S. imports informed market participants of an exogenous new supply of gold to the U.S. banking system. At only 60 basis points over deposits, the gold was priced significantly lower than the 300 basis point premium charged early that week in New York. In their announcement, the Regents of the Bank of France emphasized three points. First, the Bank's charter permitted such commercial transactions while purely financial transactions were not permitted. Next, by reducing the supply of French bills of exchange for sale, it would move the French exchange rate against London closer to parity, away from the gold export point. Finally, the facility would diminish the U.S. demand for gold in London, and thus the need for the Bank of England to maintain a high discount rate. Yves Guyot, a prominent French economist of the day, estimated the eventual size of the facility at about $16,000,000.
3 Event Seven of our study is constructed around this announcement. [Insert Figure 2 here]
The currency premium made it profitable to export gold to New York even when the currency exchange rate was not at the gold export point. Along with a deteriorating exchange rate, a related indicator of contagion surfaced with the widened spread between the discount rates offered by the Bank of England and by the Bank of France. To protect their dangerously low reserves the British had increased their bank rate three times after the U.S. premium on gold emerged. The spread between French and British bank rates reached its widest, 300 basis points, after November 7 when the Bank of England raised its rate to 7 percent. After briefly rebounding after the rate increase, British reserves resumed their decline during the week of November 21, dropping from £21,000,000 to £19,900,000. 7 Further Bank of England rate increases were expected in the face of those declining reserves. France would seek a means to avoid matching those rate increases, after having already reluctantly raised its own bank rate to 4 percent on November 7. 8 Thus, in justifying the new lending facility, the Regents referred to the U.S. gold premium's influence on both the franc/sterling exchange rate and the bank discount rate.
Finally, we find qualitative evidence consistent with our quantitative evidence. Contagion is explicitly mentioned by Governor Pallain of the Bank and by the Rothschild family, one of whose members was a Regent. Pallain worried that "contagion" of the crisis would spread to Europe and "Paris will have to raise its discount rate." 9 Faced with a request for short-term loans to aid a struggling project of their U.S. agent, August Belmont, Jr., the Rothschilds agreed to terms, preventing a situation they likened to the Baring Crisis during which a financial crisis in
London spilled over to Paris. The Regents reached a decision quickly upon receipt of the request from their constituents, and announced their approval almost immediately. We organize the factors in their deliberations as a cost/benefit analysis. The Regents found the proposal had important costs, but those costs were outweighed by significant benefits. They identified the cost of the facility as the depletion of the gold reserve. Mitigating this cost, the regents were pleased to learn that not much U.S. paper was outstanding in Paris, 15 meaning the transaction could not deplete the reserve very much. 16 In a scenario analysis in which the costs of a reduced reserve became unacceptably large, they determined that an increase in the charge for the gold eagles would be their likely policy response.
17
The consideration of the facility's benefits can be understood as a discussion about the short-term and long-term profits to the Bank, recalling that the Regents were shareholders of the To appreciate the terms of the facility, it is useful to contrast it with the process of how payments for cotton might have otherwise occurred in the presence of a gold premium. French cotton buyers congregated at the Cotton Exchange at Le Havre, the port where almost all of the U.S. cotton supply was received (Forester, 1921, p. 55) . With a depreciated franc, importers would be motivated to pay for the cotton with gold instead of an expensive bill of exchange.
20
The buyers could have shipped gold withdrawn from French circulation to the U.S. growers' New York correspondent banks, earning the gold premium upon deposit, thus reducing their cost of cotton by the net premium earned on gold. Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 here]
By accelerating the payment process for cotton, the Regents interrupted a transmission channel for contagion, the continued sale of French bills of exchange for sterling. A new supply of gold might reduce pressure on the Bank of England to increase rates again. We expect that in response to this signal of an unexpectedly early seasonal easing in monetary conditions and of a likely end to bank rate increases in London, market agents' expectations of future profitability of U.S. companies would be revised upward. 22 In a "Note for Governor Pallain" in the Archives of the Bank of France, the suggestion is made to offer Parisian bankers the gold at a premium that takes into account "the weight loss, delays and melting costs" associated with "drainage" of coins from circulation.
Data Set, Model and Results
To infer the impact of the events outlined in the previous sections on equity prices, we collect daily data on the [Insert Table 4 here] Given our focus on the seven events outlined previously, we employ a GARCH model to account for the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity associated with the residuals (Engle, 1983; Bollerslev, 1986) . In particular, the GARCH model allows for the impact of the news announcements and the potential for volatility clusters that may emerge as a result of such announcements. Taking into account the dynamic variance of returns predicated on the prior day's information set with a GARCH model may capture a possible cascading effect of such announcements on investors' expectations for the future.
The mean equation is specified as the respective returns (first-difference of the log of the indices) as a function of seven dummy variables representing the seven events outlined previously in regards to the 1907 Panic.
(1) where j t P  represents the respective returns for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Railroad Average indices;  is the constant term; and t  the random error term. In order to test the robustness of the seven events with respect to the dissemination of information, we construct the corresponding dummy variables based on the narrow and broad event windows as discussed in the Introduction. We do not vary the window length for the first four events, because being standard central bank actions or being less complex in nature, information flows were more discrete than for our last three events. Refer to Table 1 for events and dates of dummy variables.
As pointed out by Cosimano and Jensen (1988) , the absence of serial correlation is important in the mean equation in order to adequately test for the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Table 5 Though the residuals from the respective models are free of serial correlation, the residuals do exhibit time-varying variance (i.e. autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) given the statistical significance of the chi-square test statistics ARCH(1).
24
[Insert Table 5 here]
With the presence of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, the mean equation is augmented to incorporate the presence of the time-varying variance in the residuals using the GARCH(1,1) specification. equation determine the persistence in volatility due to shocks. The closer the sum of  and  is to one, the more persistent the shock.
[Insert Table 6 here]
The results of the GARCH(1,1) specifications are shown in Table 6 . As in Table 5 and the two event windows, the coefficient for the dummy variable, 
Discussion of Results

25
The GARCH-M model was also estimated, however, the conditional variance in the mean equation was statistically insignificant. Also, an augmented GARCH model in which the respective dummy variables were included in the conditional variance equation revealed statistical insignificance.
It is tempting to interpret our results as support for the notion that domestic actions by 28 Our results are probably best interpreted to mean that the reliable seasonal inflows of gold to pay for U.S. crops were meaningfully accelerated, with equity market participants recognizing that the coming tide of gold would be large enough to replenish the U.S. banking system. The fact that the source of acceleration was the central bank with the largest gold reserve likely amplified the strength of the signal.
The significance of our findings is that the action could have mitigated the contraction in industrial output by shortening the period of convertibility restrictions by several weeks. The New York Clearing House banks' resumption of deposit convertibility during the week of 27 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for prompting this line of thought. Frydman et al. (2012) and James et al. (2013) find linkages between the disruption in intermediation and economic activity in 1907. James et al. (2013) examines the relation between the convertibility restriction period and industrial production, estimating a five percentage point larger decline in industrial production for an additional four weeks of suspension when comparing the 1893 and 1907 disruptions. In the absence of the three to five week French acceleration, industrial production might have declined by several more percentage points. 30 However, as those authors note, it is impossible to precisely isolate the real impact of payments disruptions from other effects of the credit contraction during panics.
While the purpose of this study was to examine the effect of a news announcement on U.S. equity prices, we also illuminated an interesting but neglected episode in French monetary policy formation. 31 In our quest for background about Event Seven, we found motivations behind the Bank's decision to liquefy sterilized balances, its reserve ratio dropping to 69 percent at the 29 Wicker (2000, p. 100) holds that resumption by the banks did not depend on the increasing supply of gold imports but rather on the lessening of withdrawal demands and on the willingness of depositors to restore what they had withdrawn. If, however, as Sprague notes (1910, p. 186-187) , depositors often withdrew balances to profit from the subsequent sale to money brokers at the currency premium, then that profit motive may have diminished if money brokers could obtain gold from the Bank of France at only a 60 basis point premium. A premium as low as the one charged by France may have provided depositors inadequate compensation for the inconvenience of hoarding. If hoarders began re-depositing in such conditions, then our interpretation could be reconciled with that of Wicker (2000) .
end 1907 from 79 percent in 1905 and 75 percent in 1906. 32 Curiously, we find no reference in the Regents' November deliberations about our Event One, the July facility during which France drained gold from New York. 33 We do not find evidence that they regretted the July draw of gold from New York, nor that the November facility was designed to offset the July action. Finally, we offer a suggestion for why the announcement of the French intervention is largely unknown in the received historiography of the 1907 Panic, especially if it evidently mattered so much to market participants at the time. 34 Much of what we know about the 1907 Panic is from research done by the National Monetary Commission, the purpose of which was to build public support for the formation of a Central Bank. The public, however, would not have been receptive to a centralized solution such as the model offered by the Bank of France (Wicker, 2005, p. 40) .
Indeed, Senator Nelson W. Aldrich directed research concentration on the Reichsbank because the German model allowed for a more decentralized, bank-note issuing system that might work in the U.S. (Mitchell, 1911, p.568 33 French circulating medium in late July hovered around 4.7 billion francs. In November, the circulating medium drops from 5 billion francs to 4.8 billion amidst a sharp move upward in exchange on sterling, potentially presaging further outflows of circulating coin. Statistics of Great Britain, France and Germany, Part II, Table 2 , p. 312.
34 Scholars and policy makers of the day did associate international gold flows with the ultimate end of the crisis, but the specific November transaction appears to have only been explicitly covered in the popular press. Noyes (1909, p. 187 ) notes a distinguishing feature of the panic, "gold has to be bought or borrowed instantly in huge quantity from other countries." Sprague (1910, p. 284) notes the ability of the country to "secure additional supplies of gold in an emergency so long as our foreign trade is made up principally of imported luxuries and exported necessities." Treasury Secretary Cortelyou (Senate Resolution No. 33, December 12, 1907, p. 16) refers to how merchandise exports were expedited by dealers in foreign exchange.
35 "More recently, in the very midst of the crisis, the Bank released many millions of eagles…" (Patron, 1910, p. 145 ).
crisis, the importance of an accelerated arrival of gold may have simply been lost on contemporary researchers.
Concluding Remarks
The capacity for the Bank of France's announcement to change expectations of market participants for equity prices seems to have been underappreciated by financial historians. In the 1907 crisis, we find that market agents attached significant importance to a meaningfully accelerated seasonal gold inflow to pay for crops. Indeed, recent research indicates that a three to five week shortening of convertibility restriction could have significantly mitigated the decline in industrial production.
The degree to which the Regents of the Bank of France worried about contagion of the crisis also appears to be fresh insight from this study. Prior impressions had been that the Bank had not felt threatened by the crisis. In the presence of the U.S. premium on gold, French policy makers could not prevent gold outflows from circulation, but by constructing the lending facility they could influence the source of the outflows, favoring the liquefaction of reserves over drainage of the circulating coin. A counterfactual analysis of our results suggests that on its own, the facility could not likely have ended the crisis; only by following several domestic efforts undertaken to improve liquidity including Morgan's lionized actions, could the French facility have so significantly revised expectations upward.
Finally, our findings relate to other very recent scholarly work. Drainage of coin in circulation threatened economic output, be it in the U.S. experience examined by James, et al. 
Appendix Section 1
In Egypt, the movement of two larger than normal cotton crops, the construction of large port and rail projects, and an associated boom in land and stock prices were factors which would have drained the £13,600,000 gold from London to Alexandria beginning in 1906 (Onyeiwu, 2000) . 36 Following the burst in the Egyptian real estate bubble, a failure of a prominent mortgage-lending bank prompted a liquidity infusion from London (Muhleman, 1907) . The
Bank of England enlisted the aid of the Bank of France for this purpose. In India, the failure of the 1906-1907 monsoon rains caused the failure of the wheat and rice crops (Keynes, 1909) .
With its seasonal sources of gold inflows thus interrupted, Britain, Germany and France, 1867 , National Monetary Commission, 1910 . 41 New York Times, November 18, 1907 These finding contradict Patron's assertions that when the shares of the Bank of France moved up in crises periods, with all other French stocks traded higher in sympathy (Patron, 1910, p.138) . The null hypothesis is that there is no market reaction to the following events. The dummy variables correspond to the seven events. D1 t is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 for the period July 24, 1907 to July 31, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise representing Bank of France opens facility to pay interest on gold payments during trans-Atlantic shipping time in order to drain gold from U.S. to replenish French reserve. Announcements repeat from July 24, 1907 through July 31. 1907. The window length is the same for both the narrow and broad models.
D2 t is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 for August 15, 1907; October 28, 1907; November 1, 1907; November 4, 1907; and November 7, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise for Bank of England increasing its discount rate to defend its gold reserve from export. The November 7 announcement coincides with the announcement that the Bank of France purchased up to 80 million francs in sterling bills and forwarded 80 million francs in gold eagles to London. The window length is the same for both the narrow and broad models. 24, 1907 and October 25, 1907 . The window length is the same for both the narrow and broad models. D5 t is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 for the period October 28, 1907 to October 30, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise, defined as the narrow event window, represents the issuance of clearing house loans and suspension of deposit convertibility by banks on October 29, 1907 and October 30, 1907 . Alternatively, the D5 t dummy variable is equal to 1.0 for the period October 28, 1907 to November 5, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise, which is defined as the broad event window. The broad event window includes other nearby ad hoc measures of liquidity provision, especially the formation of the Trust Company Syndicate associated with the cessation of the runs on trust companies. D6 t is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 for the period November 19, 1907 and November 20, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise, defined as the narrow event window, represents the issuance of Treasury certificates and Panama Canal bonds on November 19, 1907 and November 20, 1907 . Alternatively, the D6 t dummy variables is equal to 1.0 for the period November 14, 1907 to November 21, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise, which is defined as the broad event window. The broad event window allows for publication of stories about rumors of the facility and of stories about expectations of final allotments of bonds and certificates. D7 t is a dummy variable equal to 1.0 for the period November 22, 1907 to December 7, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise, defined as the narrow event window, represents the Bank of France's operation to discount American commercial paper for gold eagles held in the Bank of France reserves. Announcements repeat from November 22, 1907 to December 3, 1907 . Alternatively, the D7 t dummy variable is equal to 1.0 for the period November 22, 1907 to December 7, 1907 and 0.0 otherwise, which is defined as the broad event window. The broad event window includes details of the French willingness to continue the facility as long as needed. 
Figure 2 Daily Midpoint of High and Low Currency Premium in Percentage Points
Notes: The mean midpoint prior to November 23 is 2.61% and the mean midpoint after November 22 is 0.55%. A two-tailed t-test was performed to determine the probability that the two means were from populations with the same mean. The probability returned was .0000512, finding it very unlikely the two means are the same. However, many factors were likely at work to bring down the premium on gold in addition to the lending facility opened by the Bank of France. It is important not to infer causality. The results, however, do not contradict the suggestion that the action taken by the Bank was associated with a declining premium on currency. 
